Triple encryption was proposed to increase the security of single encryption when the key is too short. In the past, there have been several attacks in this encryption mode. When triple encryption is based on two keys, Merkle and Hellman proposed a subtle meet-in-the-middle attack which can break it at a price similar to breaking single encryption (but with nearly all the code book). When triple encryption is based on three keys, Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner proposed a related-key attack which can break it at a price similar to breaking single encryption.
INTRODUCTION
A classical security model for symmetric encryption is the key recovery under chosen plaintext or cipher text attacks. Since ciphers are broken by generic at tacks such as exhaustive search, we must live with these attacks and hope that their complexity is the minimal cost for breaking the cipher. Indeed, a cipher is secure if there is no attack better than exhaustive search, i.e. if its complexity is lower than 2 £ where R is the key length.
In the 90's Biham and Knudsen proposed the no tion of related-key attack in which an adversary can impose to change the secret key following some cho sen relation <p (Biham, 1993; Knudsen, 1992) . One problem is that related-key attacks open the way to new generic attacks such as the ones by Biham (Biham, 1996) . So, exhaustive search may no longer be the reference for assessing the security of a cipher.
As an example of related-key attack, Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner presented an attack against three-key triple encryption which shows that this is not more secure than single encryption (Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, 1996) .
In this paper, we first discuss on various ways to compare the complexity related-key attacks. Follow ing a full-cost model, an attack is significant I; < 2 £ , where r is the number of related keys, t (resp. m) is the time (resp. memory) complexity, and p is the proba bility of success. In a more conservative approach, we shall compare max (�,m) with 2 � . We can also consider comparison in a restricted attack model in order to limit some characteristics such as the number of related keys. Then, we provide a related-key attack against two-key triple encryption. pare these attacks with ours (Phan, 2004) . The fig ures l are given on Table l . Previous attacks are dis cussed in this paper.
Our Contribution.
[n this paper, we present a new attack on triple encryption which is based on the dis covery of fixed points for the mapping x f--+ EncK 0 Enc ; ( � ) for some relation <po This discovery requires the en tire code book in a Broadcast Known Plaintext (BKP) attack for EncK and Enc cp (K) which makes our data complexity high. [n the BKP model, the adversary obtains a random plaintext and its encryption under different keys. Once we have a (good) fixed point, our attack becomes similar to a standard meet-in-the middle attack. So, it has a pretty low complexity. Fi nally, we show that our attack compares well to the best ones so far. In the 2-key case, it becomes the best known-plaintext attack.
COMPARING RELATED-KEY

ATTACKS
Given a dedicated attack against a cipher, it is tempt ing to compare it with exhaustive search and declare the cipher broken if the attack is more efficient. This is however a bit unfair because the attack model may already have better generic attacks than exhaustive search.
As an example, Biham's generic attack (Biham, 1996) applies standard time-memory tradeoffs in the related key model. His attack consists of collect ing Yi = EncK ; (x) for a fixed x and r related keys.
That is, we use r chosen plaintexts. Then, it builds a dictionary (Y;, i) and run a multi-target key recov ery to find one K such that EncK(x) is in the dictio nary. With t attempts, the probability of success is p = 1 -(1 -r2 -fy � 1 -e-rt 2 -f • The dictionary has size m = r(ji + logr) bits. For simplicity, we approx imate m � r. In particular, for t = r = 2f/ 2 , we have p � 1 -e-l � 63%, so this is much cheaper than ex haustive search.
The complexity of a related-key attack can be characterized by a multi-dimensional vector consist ing of l with sightly different units: our time complexities are measured in terms of triple encryption instead of single en cryption; our memory complexities are measured in bits in stead of 32-bit words; our number of keys include the target one and not only the related ones
• the number of related keys r (the number of keys which are involved is r, i.e. r = 1 when the attack uses no related keys);
• the data complexity d (e.g. the number of chosen plaintexts), where we may distinguish known plaintexts (KP), broadcast known plain texts (BKP), chosen plaintexts (CP), and chosen ciphertexts (CC) as the may be subject to differ ent costs in the attack model;
• the time complexity of the adversary t, where we may distinguish the precomputation complexity and the online running time complexity;
• the memory complexity m, which may further distinguish quick-access or slow-access memory, read/write memory or read-only memory;
• the probability of success p . tor. Actually, the current � factor corresponds to the worst case where iterating an attack requires new re lated keys. In many cases, related keys could just be reused, which means that the total number of related keys may be r instead of §. We can just keep in mind that the Cconservative formula may not be well adapted to attacks with a probability of success far from 1. We should rather normalize the attack using the most appropriate technique before applying the formula on the normalized attack. This kind of rule of the thumb is pretty conve nient because two attacks can always be compared by
This defines a total ordering. An attack is said conser vative-significant if it is better than generic ones fol lowing the conservative ordering. (Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, 1996) Limited Related-key Models. Arguably, related keys (or event chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts) are harder to obtain, compared to spending time in the attack. Namely, an attack of complexity 2 iE , r = 1, and d = 1 is declared not significant with ::';conservative because of the Biham attack (Biham, 1996) of complexity 2 �E , which is a bit unfair. So, we could either go back to some partial ordering or to some attack model restrictions. For instance, a common model (when we do not care about related-key attacks) con sists of limiting to r = I. A natural model would consists of limiting r ::.; Br for some bound Br. Fi nally, we can compare an attack with the best generic one using no more related keys. That is, we say that an attack is conservative-significant in th e RK-limited model if its conservative complexity is better than the one for all generic attacks using no more related keys. If (t,r,d,m,p) is the complexity vector of the attack, we shall compare Cconservative (r, d, t, m, p ) with the one of all (t', r', r', r', 1 -e-r' t ' 2 -f ) for all t' and r' ::.; r. Clearly, the minimal complexity is reached for r' = rand t' = 2 £ / r'. So, the attack is conservative
Other Limited Models.
We may also consider other limited models. For instance we can restrict to attacks using known plaintexts only. All combi nations of limitations can be imagined. The relevance of these limited models shall be driven by significance for applications.
Full-cost Model.
Wiener introduced the full cost expressed as a (t + t� + t VcPJ) where c is the num ber of processors and p is the rate of access to the memory of all processors per time unit (Wiener, 2004 The total ordering which takes parallelism tricks is a bit more complicated. Without using any parallelism trick, Biham's generic attacks have d = r, t = 2 £ /r, and m = r. So, their full cost if max(r 2 ,2 £ ). Again, this is relevant for r :::; 2 f only and the full cost is 2 £ no matter r. In this case, exhaustive search with r = 2 £ has the same full cost. An attack is full-significant if and only if Cfull(r,d,t,m,p) < 2 £ As a rule of the thumb, we could adopt the simple criterion 1m < 2 £ p .
Note that Equation (1) only gives an upper bound on the full cost which can be pessimistic. For in stance, it was shown that meet-in-the-middle (Diffie and Hellman, 1977) with a key of size ek has a full cost of 2 1£ k and may also be reduced to 2 �£ k using parallelism (Wiener, 2004) . So, the comparison based on full cost shall be done with great care.
As an application we can look at recent at tacks on AES working with p = I.
(See Table 2 .)
As we can see, the Biryukov Khovratovich attack ) on AES-192 is only conservative-significant in the RK-limited model, thanks to the low num ber of related keys, but it is not conservative significant. The Biryukov-Khovratovich-Nikolic at tack (Biryukov, Khovratovich, Nikolic, 2009 ) on AES-2S6 is conservative-significant in the RK limited model, thanks to the low number of re lated keys, but it is not conservative-significant. The Biryukov-Khovratovich attack ) on AES-2S6 is significant for all criteria.
SEMI-GENERIC RELATED-KEY ATTACKS AG AINST 3DES
We propose here a related-key attack against 3DES. It is semi-generic in the sense that is does not depend on DES but only on the structure of triple encryption which is used in 3DES, that is the encrypt-decrypt encrypt structure. We consider two cases: the 3-key and 2-key triple encryptions defined by EnCKj , K2 X3 EnCKj X2
CKj oCi 2 1 OCK3 CKj oCi} OCKj
We denote by ek the length of the K; subkeys and by e m the block length.
3-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation �(K l ,K2,K3) = (K 2,Kl ,K3). We observe that for K = (Kl , K2, K3), we have
The idea of the attack consists of looking for a plain text x such that EncK(x) = Enc cp (K) (x). By enumer ating the code book we can find one such x with com plexity 2 £ m. Indeed, this would be a fixed point for the above permutation. Given a random permutation over a domain of size 2 £ m, the expected number of fixed points is 1. Addi tionally, there are � cycles of length 2, on average. So, CKj oCi 2 1 has a number a of fixed points such that E (a) = 1 and a number b of length-2 cycles such that
, the a fixed points are still fixed points, but elements of length-2 cycles become fixed points as well. We call them bad fixed points. After enumerating the codebook, we have a + 2b fixed points. When a = 0, there are no good fixed points and it is a bad luck. This happens with probability e-1 . Our attack succeeds when a > 0, so with a suc cess probability of p = 1 -e-1 . Note that if a + 2b is odd, we are ensured that there is a good fixed point.
Assuming that x is a good fixed point, it is a fixed point of CK ] 0 CK 2 1 • We can enumerate all ek-bit keys and find pairs (Kl , K2) such that CK ] (x) = CK2 (x) with complexity 2 £ k using a meet-in-the-middle algorithm. The correct (Kl , K2) pair is always suggested if x is a good fixed point. Other pairs are called wrong pair s. We eliminate wrong pairs by using several iterations of this method. Concretely, our attach starts as shown on Fig. 1 .
So, we use r = 2n related keys, d = n2£m+ 1 broadcast let y (resp. z) be the encryption of x under key K EB Ci (resp. <p(K EB Ci )) exhaustive search exhaustive search (Biham, 1996) (Biham, 1996) 
.
If Li has an odd number of terms, we are ensured that there is at least one fixed point for CK 1
Then, the attack continues as shown on Fig. 3 .
The loop on Kl (i) takes t = 12 t k triple encryptions and m = (e m + ek)2 t k bits of memory. The loop on K 2 (i) essentially takes t = 12 t k triple encryptions (the inner loop on the found K 2( i) is negligible).
The loop on (Kl' K 2 , c) depends on the size of R. We denote Rn the expected number of remaining wrong keys in R using parameter n. Let n* -1 be the number of other lists which have an odd number of fixed points. We have 2 2t k potential pairs but an equa tion to satisfy on n* e m bits to end up in R. So, we have Rn � 2 2t k-n* i m. We have e-1
which is nearly 0. 6116 + 0. 3884 x n. So, this loop takes t = l + tn2 i k triple encryptions for a good fixed point and t = 1{' 2 t k for a bad one. In what follows we adjust n so that Rn � O. Namely, for n = 6 i:, we have Rn � 2-0 . 3t k-0 . 6t m so we can neglect wrong pairs.
The main loop and the x loop iterate until it takes a good fixed point. For each Li we have exactly i 1 cycles of length u with probability e U � i � . Let assume the probabilities for u = 1 and u = 2 are independent.
For instance, the best case is a> I (some good fixed points) and b = 0 (no bad fixed points) with proba bility e-� (1 -e-1 ) � 0. 38. We denote by Nn (resp. 
for all K2 (i) do 10:
compute Kl and K2 from Kl ( i) and K2 (i) using Ci and set C = 0 12:
for each j E I do
13:
compute Kl (j) and K2 (j) from Kl and K2 using c ,
14:
look if there is y E L, such that N�) the expected number of iterations of the i and x loops (resp. in the case that the attack succeeds). In the case of failure (a = 0), we have 2b iterations so the expected number is I for each list. That is, the ex pected number of iterations before the attack fails is n. Since this happens with probability e-n , we have where the sum does not depend on n. We computed some values of Nn in Table 3 . So, the number of iter ations can be approximated to 2 in any success case.
Finally, the total complexity is of In general, we suggest n :::: :; 6 ;:, to get t = � 2fk in a success case.
In the case of DES, we have £k = 56 and £m = 64. We take n = 3 to get n * :::: :; 1. 777 and Rn:::: :; 2-1 . 7 2 . So, we use r = 6 keys. We use d = 2 6 7 chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts, or known plaintexts. The time com plexity is t = 2 5 7 triple encryptions in the all cases. The memory complexity is m = 2 63 bits in the chosen message variant and m = 27 2 in the known plaintext variant. The key to recover has 168 bits. The attack succeeds with probability p = 95%. Note that this at tack is better than the generic related-key attack using tradeoffs. It works in the ideal cipher model. Bellare and Rogaway proved that the best (non-related-key) generic attack in the ideal cipher model would require at least 27 8 encryptions (Bellare and Rogaway, 2006) . This example shows that the result no longer holds in the related-key model.
In the case we would like to use a triple AES en cryption, we obtain different results which are sum marized in Table 4 . Comparison with the Kelsey-Schneier-Wagner At tack. Kelsey, Schneier, and Wagner presented a related-key attack against 3-key triple encryption which has similar performances (Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, 1996) . It consists in using <p (Kl ,K2,K3) = (K l tB11., K2,K3) Then, EncK 0 Enc ;( � ) = CK I 0 CK l l EB � which only de pends on K l . So, exhaustive search can recover K l .
For DES, this attack has r = 2, d = 2 (known and cho sen plaintexts), t = 2 56 encryptions, m = 2 56 bits, and p = 100%. So, it is better than our attack. Contrarily to ours, it has no extension to 2-key triple encryption. However, this attack extends to the encrypt-encrypt encrypt triple encryption mode whereas our attack re stricts to the encrypt-decrypt-encrypt construction.
Note that getting EncK 0 Enc ;( � ) (y) = z on a random y is equivalent to getting Encdx) = y and Enc<p(K ) (x) = z on a random x. So, this attack is in the BKP model.
Comparison with the Phan Attack. In the cate gory of known plaintext attacks, Phan (Phan, 2004 ) uses <P(KI ,K2,K3) = (Kl ,K3,K2)
(which is similar to our relation) and a slide attack. It breaks 3-key triple encryption using r = 2, d = 2 33 (known and chosen plaintexts), t = 12 88 triple en cryptions, and m = 2 38 bits. This attack extends to encrypt-encrypt-encrypt and to 2-key triple encryp tion (with a memory complexity inflated to m = 2 94.5 bits). Our known plaintext attack uses a quite lower time complexity but a higher number of chosen plain texts.
2-Key Triple Encryption Case
We use the relation <P(KI ,K2) = (K 2,K J So, E(a) = I and E(b) = 1. The number of values x obtained is a + 3b. If it is no multiple of 3 then we have a good fixed point for sure.
The final complexity is very similar to the 3-key encryption case. The difference is that we no longer need the exhaustive search on K3 and wrong ( Kl , K2) pairs are discarded by a simple consistency check. We can work with n = 1 and p = 63%. The first part of the algorithm works like in the 3-key case with two variants on Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . The second part of the algorithm is shown on Fig. 4 .
In the case of DES, we take n = 1, so r = 2. We use d = 2 65 chosen plaintexts or ciphertexts. The time complexity is t = 2 56 triple encryptions in the all cases. The memory complexity is m = 2 63 bits and the key to recover has 112 bits. The known plaintext variant uses d = 2 65 known plaintexts and the mem ory complexity becomes m = 2 7 2 bits. The attack suc ceeds with probability p = 63%. Comparison with other attacks is presented in Table 1 .
